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I. Introduction
Carlos Gutierrez (Gutierrez) spent a year abusing Mailin
Stafford (Mailin), his three-year-old stepdaughter, for sucking on
her thumbs.' He subjected her to frequent beatings and spankings,
forced her to eat chili peppers and Tabasco sauce and threw her
into freezing cold showers until she began to drown or turn blue.2
On June 15, 2004, Gutierrez punched her in the stomach one last
t B.A., New York University, 2010; J.D. Candidate, University of North
Carolina School of Law, 2014. 1 would like to thank my family and friends for
their love and support, both my grandfathers for their inspiration in my writing
and legal career, and Logan and Matt for listening to me talk about the details of
this case for far too many months.
I See Gutierrez v. State, 112 Nev. 788, 790, 920 P.2d 987, 988 (1996).
2 Id
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
time before she crawled onto his lap and died.3 A three-judge
panel sentenced Gutierrez to death.' On his first appeal,
Gutierrez's death sentence was affirmed.' He then filed a second
appeal, seeking a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, which the Second Judicial District Court of Nevada
dismissed on procedural grounds.6 On appeal, Gutierrez argued
that he suffered actual prejudice because the United States failed
to inform him of his right to consular assistance, which was in
violation of Article 36(l)(b) of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations (Vienna Convention).' Mexico had previously
filed suit against the United States in the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) for denying Carlos Avena Guillen and numerous
other Mexican nationals their right to consular access under the
Vienna Convention.' In Case Concerning Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals (Avena), the ICJ found the United States had
violated its international legal obligations under the Vienna
Convention by failing to notify the Mexican nationals of their
consular rights.' The ICJ directed the United States to reassess the
convictions of Avena and the other Mexican nationals. 0
After Avena, the United States Supreme Court in Medellin v.
Texas" held state courts were not required to enforce the ICJ
decisionl2 and that Avena did not preempt state procedural rules
that barred prisoners from raising Vienna Convention claims in
3 Id. at 791, 920 P.2d at 989.
4 Id. at 789, 920 P.2d at 988. .
5 Id.
6 Gutierrez v. State, No. 53506, 2012 WL 4355518 (Nev. Sept. 19, 2012).
7 Id. at 2.
8 See Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v.
U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31).
9 Id. at 71.
10 Emily Culp, A Father Waits: Medellin v. Texas and the Application of
World Court Decisions on U.S. Domestic Law, 35 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
233, 240 (2009).
11 Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
12 See Culp, supra note 10, at 243 (citing Medellin, 552 U.S. 491)
("Having found that the Vienna Convention on Consular Rights was a non-self-
executing treaty and that Congress had yet to advance any specific legislation
implementing its provisions, the Supreme Court found that the Avena decision
was not automatically binding domestic law.").
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successive habeas corpus petitions.13  However, in his
concurrence, Justice Stevens noted the Court's decision did not
prohibit states from voluntarily choosing to comply with the
foreign court's decision. 4
On September 19, 2012, the Supreme Court of Nevada became
only the second court in the United States to reconsider a
conviction based on the ICJ's decision in Avena.s Nevada's
decision to uphold the ICJ's mandate in its courts provides
important protection for foreign nationals seeking review of their
convictions based on Vienna Convention violations. The decision
shows a much-needed trend towards greater international
cooperation by the United States.16  Part II of this Note will
explore the facts and holding of the Nevada Supreme Court in
Gutierrez v. Nevada. Part III will examine the Vienna
Convention, the Avena decision, and previous decisions in
applying the procedural rights of the Vienna Convention to state
courts. Part IV will analyze the implications of Gutierrez on the
future of international legal rights in the state court system. Part V
will conclude by urging attorneys to continue pursuing Vienna
Convention obligations as a procedural right to which defendants
are entitled.
II. Statement of the Case
A. Facts
Mailin, born January 29, 1991, was the three-year-old daughter
of Tara Gutierrez (Tara).17 On December 4, 1992, Tara married
13 Sandra Babcock, Nevada's Supreme Court Upholds ICJ Ruling on
Consular Rights of Mexicans, DEATH PENALTY WORLDWIDE (Sept. 25, 2012,
5:04 AM), http://blog.law.northwestern.edu/cihr/2012/09/nevadas-supreme-
court-upholds-icj-ruling-on-consular-rights-of-mexicans.html.
14 Id In furtherance of the United States' disregard for the Avena
decision, Texas executed Umberto Leal Garcia in 2011, in violation of the ICJ
mandate. Id.
15 Id. Oklahoma was the first state to uphold the decision in Torres v. State
of Oklahoma. See infra III.C.2.
16 See generally Gutierrez v. State, No. 53506, 2012 WL 4355518 (Nev.
Sept. 19, 2012) (holding that the defendant suffered actual prejudice due to the
lack of consular assistance resulting from alleged lack of proper notice to
consular officials).
17 Gutierrez v. State, 112 Nev. 788, 789, 920 P.2d 987, 988 (1996).
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Gutierrez, and in May 1993, the three of them moved in with
Gutierrez's brother for a month." Gutierrez punished Mailin
every time he caught her sucking on her thumb. 9 He would
"spank her with a sandal" on her hands, behind, and upper legs.20
He spanked her with such force that it would knock Mailin back
and bruise her.2 1 In the summer of 1993, Gutierrez moved the
family in with their friends for a week, during which he punished
the two-year-old Mailin each day for her thumb-sucking habit.22
In addition to the spankings, he "fed her hot chilies ... in an
attempt to get her to stop sucking her thumb."2 3 Mailin received
more spankings for wetting her bed, which resulted in bruises on
her behind and hands.24 The family then moved to an apartment in
July or August of 1993.25 Mailin's grandparents reported her
injuries ("bruises on her face, back, lower [behind], arms, and
hands") to the police.2 6 She was sent to foster care on August 19,
1993, but returned to her parents within two months on October
13, 1993.27
Mailin sucked her thumb until January or February of 1994
and, even after she stopped, Gutierrez continued to beat her
approximately four times a week.28 In addition-to the chili pepper
punishment, she was also forced to drink Tabasco sauce, which
made her vomit.29  Gutierrez began to punish Mailin for her
vomiting through a shower treatment, subjecting her to a cold
shower until she began to drown and turn blue.3 0 She was also
forced to "eat her own vomit and feces." 3' After the first shower
18 Id.
'9 Id.
20 Id.
21 /d.
22 Id.
23 Gutierrez, 112 Nev. at 790, 920 P.2d at 988.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Gutierrez, 112 Nev. at 790, 920 P.2d at 988.
30 Id.
31 Justice Says Torture of Child Calls for Death, LAS VEGAS SUN, Apr. 10,
2006, http://www.1asvegassun.com/news/1996/apr/10/j ustice-says-torture-of-
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treatment, Tara found Gutierrez with blood on his hands and
Mailin with blood in her mouth. 32  This shower treatment
continued weekly.33 When Mailin became unable to withstand the
cold showers, Gutierrez subjected her to hot showers.34 He also
began to punch and kick the three-year-old in the stomach. On
June 15, 1994, Gutierrez responded to Mailin's call for her mother
from the bathroom.36 Mailin was ordered to take off her clothes.3 7
"Tara heard water running, then heard a loud bang."3  When
Mailin walked out of the bathroom, she was crying, awkward, and
dizzy, with a new bruise on her stomach.3 9 Mailin cringed in pain
as Gutierrez pushed in at the bruise on her stomach.4 0 Mailin
quietly played with her sister, Tatiana,4 1 for a half hour, "then
crawled onto Gutierrez's lap and died."4 2 Gutierrez and Tara
wrapped the three-and-a-half-year-old child's body in a blanket
and threw her into a ravine near Fillmore, California.43 They
returned to Reno and reported that Mailin had been kidnapped.44
Two days later, Gutierrez and Tara "led authorities to the ravine
where her bruised and battered body was found." 45
Mailin's mother was charged with felony child neglect, and
Gutierrez pled guilty to first-degree murder.4 6  "Following a
sentencing hearing, the three-judge panel found one aggravator
child-calls-for-death/.
32 Gutierrez, 112 Nev. at 790, 920 P.2d at 988.
33 Id.
34 Id
35 Id
36 Id. at 791, 920 P.2d at 989.
37 Id.
38 Gutierrez, 112 Nev. at 791, 920 P.2d at 989.
39 Id.
40 Id
41 Tatiana Gutierrez was born to Gutierrez and Tara on September 23,
1993. Id. at 790, 920 P.2d 988.
42 Gutierrez, 112 Nev. at 791, 920 P.2d at 989.
43 Id
44 Id.
45 Brendan Riley, Death Sentences Upheld in Two Northern Nevada
Cases, LAS VEGAS SUN, (June 10, 2000), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/
2000/jun/10/death-sentences-upheld-in-two-northern-nevada-case/.
46 Id
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(torture and depravity of mind) and one mitigator (no prior
criminal history). The panel determined that the mitigator did not
outweigh the aggravator and sentenced Gutierrez to death."'
Gutierrez appealed the sentence to the Supreme Court of Nevada,
claiming his death sentence was excessive and imposed "under the
influence of passion or prejudice."4 8 The Supreme Court of
Nevada affirmed his death sentence because "[t]he incidents
leading to Mailin's death present a parade of horrors, which were
neither isolated nor the product of a sudden act of rage."'9
Following the Nevada Supreme Court's initial decision,
Gutierrez filed a second postconviction petition for a writ of
habeas corpus."o The Second Judicial District Court in Washoe
County, Nevada dismissed the petition on procedural grounds."
Gutierrez, then appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of
Nevada.5 2 The Nevada Supreme Court reversed the lower court's
dismissal, remanding the issue for an evidentiary hearing
regarding Gutierrez's "ability to overcome the procedural bars to
further consideration of his death sentence."
B. Nevada's Incorporation of Avena
In its initial decision, the Supreme Court of Nevada contended
that, absent a mandate from Congress, Nevada courts could choose
to subordinate their own procedural rules in favor of those
allowing consular access, thereby following in Avena's footsteps. 54
It also ruled Nevada's state courts may choose to uphold Avena
when those arrested show a lack of access to their consulate
actually prejudiced their case." Here, the Nevada Supreme Court
found Gutierrez had been prejudiced by his lack of consular
47 Gutierrez, 112 Nev. at 789, 920 P.2d at 988.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 792, 920 P.2d at 989.
50 Gutierrez v. State, No. 53506, 2012 WL 4355518, at *1 (Nev. Sept. 19,
2012).
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
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access.56 In support of this finding, the Mexican consulate closest
to Reno submitted an affidavit that it would have provided
assistance to Gutierrez had they received timely notification.57
The court weighed this affidavit with Gutierrez's background,
which included minimal education and limited knowledge of
English."
In its ruling, the court was particularly concerned about the
fact that the interpreter, who served Gutierrez during his initial
sentencing, was convicted of perjury one year after Gutierrez
received his death sentence.5 9 While the interpreter swore under
oath that he was a certified interpreter, he was not.60 In Nevada,
criminal defendants with limited English capabilities have a due
process right to an interpreter.6 ' The interpreter's perjury violated
Gutierrez's due process right.6 2 In turn, Gutierrez argued with
consular access, the officials would have
"(1) ensured that he understood the United States legal system and
the proceedings against him; (2) attended the proceedings, assisted
trial counsel, and endeavored to ensure a fair trial;
(3) informed him and counsel of Gutierrez's treaty rights; and (4)
monitored counsel's representation and language interpretation." 6 3
While the United States Constitution does not require interpreters
to be certified, it does require the State and the defense to mount
reliable evidence.6 4  "Errors that fundamentally alter the
defendant's statements or the context of his statements may render
the interpretation constitutionally inadequate [under this
requirement of reliability]." 65 Accordingly, the Supreme Court of
56 Gutierrez v. State, No. 53506, 2012 WL 4355518, at *2 (Nev. Sept. 19,
2012).
57 Id
58 Id.
59 Id
60 Id.
61 Ouanbengboune v. State, 125 Nev. 763, 768, 220 P.3d 1122, 1126
(2009) (quoting Ton v. State, 110 Nev. 970, 971, 878 P.2d 986, 987 (1994)).
62 See Gutierrez, No. 53506, 2012 WL 4355518, at *3.
63 Id. at *4 (Parraguirre, J., dissenting).
64 Id. at *2 (majority opinion) (citing United States v. Si, 333 F.3d 1041,
1043 n.3 (9th Cir. 2003)).
65 Id. at *2 n.5 (citing Baltazar-Monterrosa v. State, 122 Nev. 606, 614-
17, 137 P.3d 1137, 1142-44 (Nev. 2006)).
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Nevada upheld the Avena decision's applicability in state court
and reversed and remanded Gutierrez's case for an evidentiary
hearing.6 6
III.Background Law
A. Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
Imagine yourself arrested in a foreign nation. You do not
understand the language. You do not understand the legal system.
You may not even know why you were arrested. To remedy
situations like this, signatories to the Vienna Convention
established the right to obtain consular access as a fundamental
form of protection for nationals in international law. 7 This idea
was codified in the Vienna Convention, signed on April 24, 1963,
and entered into force on March 19, 1967.68 The agreement sets
forth guidelines to promote friendly relations among the forty-nine
signatory nations and "ensure[s] the efficient performance of
functions by consular posts on behalf of their respective States."
While individuals are afforded few protections from the laws of
the nations they visit, individuals in foreign lands enjoy
protections based on customary principles of international law.70
One such principle is embedded in Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention, which provides "a foreign national [the right] to
contact his consulate upon detention or arrest in a foreign land.",7
Article 36 reads:
1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions
relating to nationals of the sending State:
(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals
of the sending State and to have access to them. Nationals of the
sending State shall have the same freedom with respect to
66 Id. at *2.
67 Howard S. Schiffman, Breard and Beyond: The Status of Consular
Notification and Access Under the Vienna Convention, 8 CARDOZO J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 27, 32 (2000) (footnote omitted).
68 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77,
596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
69 Id. at Preamble.
70 Kelly Trainer, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in the
United States Courts, 13 TRANSNAT'L LAW 227, 229 (2000).
71 Id.
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communication with and access to consular officers of the
sending State;
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving
State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the
sending State if, within its consular district, a national of that
State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending
trial or is detained in any other manner. Any communication
addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in prison,
custody or detention shall also be forwarded by the said
authorities without delay. The said authorities shall inform the
person concerned without delay of his rights under this sub-
paragraph;
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the
sending State who is in prison, custody or detention, to converse
and correspond with him and to arrange for his legal
representation. They shall also have the right to visit any
national of the sending State who is in prison, custody or
detention in their district in pursuance of a judgment.
Nevertheless, consular officers shall refrain from taking action
on behalf of a national who is in prison, custody or detention if
72he expressly opposes such action.
The statute was a source of high debate at the Vienna
Convention and was left out of the initial draft. 73 However, the
purpose of the statute was to provide assistance to foreigners who
may be detained without any understanding of the host country's
language, their legal rights in the host country, or perhaps even the
cause of their arrest.74 The statute provides consular access to help
understand the legal system of the arresting nation, provides a
support system in a stressful situation, secures bilingual legal
representation, and provides an overall stronger legal defense.
72 Vienna Convention, supra note 68, art. 36.
73 United Nations Conference on Consular Relations: Official Records,
Mar. 4-Apr. 22, 1963, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.25/6 (1963); see also LUKE T.
LEE, VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS 107 (1966) ("Of all the
provisions in the Vienna Convention, the one with by far the most tortuous and
checkered background is indubitably Article 36 concerning consular
communication and contact with the nationals of the sending state.").
74 See Trainer, supra note 70, at 234.
75 See Adrienne M. Tranel, The Ruling of the International Court of
Justice in Avena and Other Mexican Nationals: Enforcing the Right to Consular
Assistance in U.S. Jurisprudence, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 403, 411-12 (2005)
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The United States ratified the Vienna Convention in 1969 and
agreed to ICJ jurisdiction over any disputes between nations.76
"However, in March 2005, President Bush withdrew the United
States from the Optional Protocol that gives the ICJ jurisdiction to
hear disputes arising under the Vienna Convention."7 7 The United
States steadfastly advocates that foreign nations enforce Vienna
Convention consular rights when detaining American citizens
within their borders; however, the United States does not exercise
the same consideration and respect for foreign nationals detained
here.7 The ICJ has found the United States in breach of their
Vienna Convention obligations three times. 79 The United States'
consistent disregard of its own violations has fostered bitterness in
the international community.o The United States' focus on
international cooperation has been questioned." Experts maintain
that "compliance serves to protect the interests of the United States
abroad, promotes the effective conduct of foreign relations, and
underscores the United States' commitment in the international
community to the rule of law."8 2 Indeed, threats to the United
(highlighting a myriad of reasons that make consular access an important right
for foreign nationals).
76 Sandra J. Weiland, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations:
Persuasive Force or Binding Law?, 33 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 675, 678
(2005).
77 Id.
78 See id. at 675; see also Trainer, supra note 70, at 230 ("However, the
United States has a less than perfect record when it comes to affording these
rights to foreign nationals detained in America."); see also Roberto Iraola,
Federal Criminal Prosecutions and the Right to Consular Notification Under
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, 105 W. VA. L. REv. 179, 180-81 (2002)
("[S]everal foreign governments reportedly raised 'strong protests' about the
failure of the State Department to notify them promptly about the apprehension
of their citizens.").
79 The ICJ has also heard the Breard case brought by Paraguay (Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), Provisional Measure, 1998
I.C.J. 248 (Apr. 9)) and the LaGrand case brought by Germany (LaGrand (Ger.
v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27)). See Weiland, supra note 76, at 676; see
discussion infra Part III.B (discussing the most recent violation found in the
Avena decision).
80 See Weiland, supra note 76, at 676.
81 Id.
82 Id. (quoting Amnesty International, USA: Another "Double Standard"
on Consular Rights, (Mar. 10, 2005), http://amnesty.org/en/library/info/
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States and its citizens abroad have increased dramatically in the
past decade.13  A consistent policy of upholding the Vienna
Convention in state and federal courts would ensure a relationship
of continued reciprocity to protect the rights of American citizens
abroad.84
The Vienna Convention treaty was ratified by the United
States Senate and approved by the President, making the
Convention the "supreme Law of the Land.""5 It would seem that
state courts are bound to uphold the Vienna Convention in their
own proceedings under the Supremacy Clause, as the "supreme
Law of the Land" would trump state law."6 The Supremacy
Clause states, in pertinent part, "all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the Contrary notwithstanding."87 As Justice Stevens noted in
Torres v. Mullin, "[t]he Court is ... unfaithful to ... [the]
command [of the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution] when it permits state courts to disregard the Nation's
treaty obligations."" Furthermore, the Vienna Convention falls
under the fundamental international law principle of pacta sunt
servanda, requiring parties to a treaty to perform treaty obligations
in good faith.8 9
AMR51/050/2005/en).
83 Id.
84 See id.
85 Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998); U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
86 See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230-31 (1942) (finding that
treaties will govern in the presence of inconsistent state law); see also Erik G.
Luna & Douglas J. Sylvester, Beyond Breard, 17 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 147, 154
(1999) ("[T]reaty-based rights are superior to State laws or policies and even
trump earlier inconsistent federal legislation.").
87 U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
88 Torres v. Mullin, 540 U.S. 1035, 1037 (2003) (Stevens, J., op.
respecting denial of pet. for writ of cert.)).
89 Cara S. O'Driscoll, The Execution of Foreign Nationals in Arizona:
Violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
323, 328 (2000) (quoting the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26,
May 23, 1969, S. TREATY Doc. No. 92-1, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331) ("This rule is
embodied in Article 26 of the Treaty Convention, which states that 'Every
treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them
2013 201
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However, despite this seemingly clear constitutional language,
there has been much debate over the binding nature of
international treaties on state judicial proceedings.90 This debate
has focused two theories regarding the relationship between
international and domestic law: monism and dualism." The
monist view has been framed as a system where international and
domestic laws are connected as one legal order, and international
law is automatically incorporated into domestic law.92 In this
view, international law is supreme.9 3 Alternatively, dualism is a
system where international and domestic laws are distinct entities,
and international law is incorporated on a case-by-case basis.94
"The dualist theory . .. is a constitutional axiom in contemporary
United States jurisprudence."
Courts have been largely deferential to the United States
Department of State's interpretation of international treaties. 96 The
in good faith."').
90 See Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the
Internationalist Conception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529, 553 (1999). See generally
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Abiding Relevance of Federalism
to U.S. Foreign Relations, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 675 (1998) (discussing Virginia's
and the federal government's treatment of the ICJ order in the Breard case).
91 Bradley, supra note 90, at 530; see also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 32-35 (4th ed. 1990); Louis HENKIN,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 64-67 (1995); 1 OPPENHEIM'S
INTERNATIONAL LAW 53-56 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed.
1992).
92 See Bradley, supra note 90, at 530.
93 Id. Although this view requires giving up a certain level of sovereignty
of a nation in complying with the international norms, it also encourages a
greater level of international cooperation.
94 Id.
95 James A.R. Nafziger & Edward M. Wise, The Status in United States
Law of Security Council Resolutions Under Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. Supp. 421, 422-23 (1998). For further discussion
on the incorporation of international law domestically, see Bradley, supra note
90.
96 Iraola, supra note 78, at 185 n.30 and accompanying text (quoting El Al
Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 168 (1999) ("Respect is
ordinarily due the reasonable views of the Executive Branch concerning the
meaning of an international treaty.")); Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano,
457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982) ("Although not conclusive, the meaning attributed
to treaty provisions by the Government agencies charged with their negotiation
and enforcement is entitled to great weight."); Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S.
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Vienna Convention requires a detained foreign national to receive
notification of his or her Vienna Convention rights "without
delay."" This timing has been interpreted as requiring authorities
to inform the national of his or her rights "as soon as reasonably
possible under the circumstances." 98 The State Department has
made clear that this requires notifying a foreign national of his
right to contact his consulate before he is booked for detention. 99
The Department has further clarified that notification should be
given "within 24 to 72 hours of the arrest or detention."100
B. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals
(Mexico v. United States of America)
On January 9, 2003, Mexico brought suit against the United
States to the ICJ for violations of the Vienna Convention in
Avena.'0o This became the third case brought to the ICJ against
the United States for violating the Vienna Convention.102 Mexico
alleged the United States had violated Article 36 Vienna
Convention rights of fifty-two Mexican nationals by failing to
inform them of their right to consular access.'03 Specifically,
Mexico alleged the United States failed to provide the Mexican
187, 194 (1961) ("[T]he meaning given [treaties] by the departments of
government particularly charged with their negotiation and enforcement is
given great weight.").
97 See Vienna Convention, supra note 68, art. 36.
98 Iraola, supra note 78, at 185 (quoting United States v. Miranda, 65 F.
Supp. 2d 1002, 1005 (D. Minn. 1999) (finding the defendant's rights had been
violated under the Convention where he was not notified of his right to consular
access until two days after being arrested, though he had been notified of his
Miranda rights immediately following his arrest, and holding that he could have
been told of his consular rights much earlier under the circumstances)); see U.S.
Dep't of State, Consular Notification and Access 21 (2010), available at
http://travel.state.gov/pdf/cna/CNAManual_3d Edition.pdf.
99 See U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 98, at 21; see also United States v.
Alvarado-Torres, 45 F. Supp. 2d 986, 991 (S.D. Cal. 1999), aff'd, 230 F.3d
1368 (9th Cir. 2000).
100 U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 98, at 25.
101 Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.),
2004 I.C.J. 128, at 12 (Mar. 31).
102 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
103 See Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 24 (explaining that Mexico amended its
original claim of the United States violating the rights of fifty-four Mexican
nationals to fifty-two).
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nationals with information about their consular rights "without
delay" after having enough knowledge to ascertain the nationality
of these individuals.10 4 The Mexican consulate became aware of
twenty-nine of the fifty-two cases only after the death penalty had
already been imposed'o' and in three, learned of the violation only
after "no judicial remedies remain[ed]."' 0 6 The ICJ held the
United States had once again breached its Vienna Convention
obligations:
(1) By failing to inform the Mexican nationals of their rights
under Articles 36, paragraph 1(b) "without delay upon their
detention."' 07
(2) "[B]y not notifying the appropriate Mexican consular post
without delay of the detention of the 49 Mexican nationals
referred to in paragraph 106(2)" and thus depriving Mexico of
the ability to render assistance to the individuals in a timely
fashion; 0 8
(3) By depriving Mexico of the ability to "communicate with
and have access to those nationals and to visit them in
detention" in a timely fashion;109 and
(4) By depriving Mexico of its ability to arrange legal
representation for the nationals in a timely fashion."o
The ICJ interpreted the "without delay" language of Article
36(1)(b) to mean "a duty upon the arresting authorities to give that
information to an arrested person as soon as it is realized that the
person is a foreign national, or once there are grounds to think that
the person is probably a foreign national.""' The Court further
provided for an appropriate remedy to affected nationals when the
United States breaches its international obligations under the
Vienna Convention."12 The ICJ found the appropriate remedy for
104 Id. at 23.
105 Id. at 26.
106 Id. at 26-27.
107 Id. at 71.
108 Id.
109 Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 71.
110 Id. at 72.
"' Id. at 49 (distinguishing that there is not a duty to inform the detainee of
his consular right "immediately upon arrest").
112 Id. at 72.
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these breaches to be the "review and reconsideration of the
convictions and sentences of the Mexican nationals" by the United
States."' The standard specified by the ICJ for review is that the
United States courts must ascertain whether the violation caused
actual prejudice to the defendant in the administration of criminal
justice.1 4 It further provided that the effective means of review
and reconsideration should include a full examination of the
violation and possible prejudice."' "Lastly, review and
reconsideration should be both of the sentence and of the
conviction.""'6 It leaves some discretion to the United States in its
review by allowing the review to be "by means of its own
choosing[.]""' The ICJ recognized some of the defendants in
Avena had not exhausted their judicial remedies, and thus the
United States could still review and reconsider their cases easily
and fulfill its obligations under Article 36."' However, a
procedural bar could be a potential problem." 9  Vienna
Convention violation claims are procedurally barred on appeal if
they were not raised at the trial court level;'20 thus, a "catch-22"l21
113 Id.
114 Id. at 60.
115 Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 65 (referencing the Court's prescription in
LaGrand).
116 Id.
"17 Id. at 72.
s18 Id. at 27 (noting that judicial remedies were exhausted in three cases,
that there was still an opportunity for direct appeal in twenty-four cases, and
that habeas corpus relief was available in the remaining twenty-five cases).
119 Heather L. Finstuen, From the World Court to Oklahoma Court: The
Significance of Torres v. State for International Court of Justice Authority,
Individual Rights, and the Availability of Remedy in Vienna Convention
Disputes, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 255, 256 (2005).
120 Id. This has become known as the procedural default rule. See Colter
Paulson, Compliance with Final Judgments of the International Court ofJustice
Since 1987, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 434, 444-46 (2004); see also Sarah M.
Ray, Domesticating international Obligations: How to Ensure U.S. Compliance
with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1729,
1753 (2003).
121 See generally JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22 (Simon & Schuster, 1961)
(providing that "catch-22" is a term derived from the novel of the same name by
Joseph Heller, referring to a situation where a problem cannot be solved
because the only solution is not possible due to a circumstance inherent in the
problem or by a rule).
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arises in requiring defendants to raise a claim of the violation
based on a right of which they are unaware. The continued failure
of United States officials to provide notice of Vienna Convention
rights to foreign nationals coupled with the procedural bar "has led
to a 'systematic failure' of the United States to comply with
Vienna Convention obligations."' 22
While the United States has been strict in requiring other
nations to adhere to the Vienna Convention when arresting or
detaining American citizens, American courts rarely implement
the requests of ICJ decisions and continue to disregard their
international legal obligations.'23 However, there is little that may
be done to ensure the United States complies with these decisions
since the only mechanism under the United Nations Charter for
requiring a nation to enforce ICJ decisions is to seek enforcement
through the United Nations Security Council.'24 The Charter does
not explicitly require ICJ decisions to have direct domestic legal
effect, and doing so would raise several constitutional issues.'2 5 It
may be beneficial for the United States to give deference to the
interpretation of treaties by the international body because it is
"desirable to have a common understanding of the meaning of a
treaty."' 2 6  When the United States has consented to an
adjudicative proceeding by the ICJ, it would seem to follow that
they have "delegated some interpretative authority to the
tribunal"'2 7 and should then give "respectful consideration to the
122 Finstuen, supra note 119, at 257 (citing Note, Too Sovereign but Not
Sovereign Enough: Are U.S. States Beyond the Reach of the Law of Nations?,
116 HARv. L. REv. 2654, 2654 (2003)).
123 See infra Part III.C.
124 U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 2. However, it is important to note that the
United States is a permanent member of the Security Council, id. art. 23, para.
1, and can veto any decisions of the Security Council. See id. art. 27, para. 2-3
(requiring the concurring vote every permanent member of the Security Council
for all non-procedural matters).
125 See Curtis A. Bradley, Enforcing the Avena Decision in U.S. Courts, 30
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 119, 121 (2006) ("ICJ judges are not subject to the
appointment and life tenure provisions . . . , making it problematic to vest ICJ
judges with the authority to displace United States laws and decisions
directly. ... [Second] the Avena decision would override state criminal laws and
procedures .. . such direct effectuation would raise federalism concerns.").
126 Id. at 123.
127 Id.
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interpretation of an international treaty rendered by an
international court with jurisdiction to interpret such."1 2 8  State
courts have split on whether or not to adhere to the ICJ
interpretation, and the United States Supreme Court has suggested
states may voluntarily comply with the Vienna Convention
requirements, if they so choose. 129
C. The State Split in Addressing Avena in State Court
Proceedings
1. Torres v. State of Oklahoma
In May 2004, Oklahoma issued an unprecedented ruling
incorporating international law into Oklahoma state law.iso Here,
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals remanded a case for an
evidentiary hearing due to a violation of the defendant's Vienna
Convention right to consular access under Article 36."'
Accordingly, Torres, the defendant, became the first inmate on
death row to have his execution stayed on the basis of an ICJ
decision.13 2 This case presented an issue of first impression; it was
the first instance in which a United States court was required to
decide whether or not to uphold the Avena decision in its
proceedings. 13
Osbaldo Torres, a Mexican national, received death penalty
sentences when he was convicted for two counts of first-degree
128 Id. (citing Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998) (per curiam)).
129 See Medellin case discussion, infra Part III.C.
130 Torres v. State, 120 P.3d 1184 (Okla. Crim. App. May 13, 2004) (order
granting stay of execution and remanding case for evidentiary hearing).
However, this year, Oklahoma was confronted with another Article 36
Violation of the Vienna Convention and did not use Torres v. State as
controlling law in declining to affirm a trial court's decision to suppress
testimony made by defendants to the police without consular advice. State v.
Ramos, 97 P.3d 1251 (Okla. Crim. App. Mar. 13, 2013). This case did not
involve an Avena defendant and is distinguishable from Torres; however it does
demonstrate a continued reluctance to provide adequate remedies to defendants
for violations of international law. Id.
131 Id. at 1185.
132 Finstuen, supra note 119, at 255.
133 Torres, 120 P.3d at 1187 (order granting stay of execution and
remanding case for evidentiary hearing).
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murder.13 4  In a 1999 federal habeas review, Torres appealed,
asserting a breach of his Vienna Convention rights.' The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's rejection of
the claim based on the procedural default rule articulated in
Breard3 6 because Torres had not asserted this claim in the earlier
state proceedings.13 7 On November 17, 2003, the United States
Supreme Court denied Torres' petition for a writ of certiorari.138
In its decision, Justice Stevens opined "[a]pplying the procedural
default rule to Article 36 claims is not only in direct violation of
the Vienna Convention, but it is also manifestly unfair."1 39 In light
of the Avena decision requiring judicial review and
reconsideration of the violation of the Vienna Convention rights,
Torres filed a subsequent application for post-conviction relief
with the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, 140 to which the
court responded just five days prior to Torres' scheduled
execution.14 The Oklahoma court's response ordered a stay of
execution and remanded Torres's case for an evidentiary hearing
to determine whether Torres had been prejudiced by Oklahoma's
violation of his Vienna Convention rights.14 2 "The [court's] order
coincided with the Oklahoma Pardon and Parole Board's
134 Id. at 1184.
135 Id. at 1184-85.
136 See Torres v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1145, 1159 (10th Cir. 2003); see also
Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375-77 (1998).
137 See Torres, 317 F.3d at 1145 (10th Cir. 2003) (upholding Torres's
conviction because: "(1) the prosecution's evidence was ruled sufficient to
establish that [the] petitioner intended the death of victims [which] was not an
unreasonable application of established law;" (2) the "jury was instructed
adequately on the intent required for malice murder" and these instructions were
not "contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of federal law;" (3) the
"prosecutor's comments did not deny [the] right to [a] presumption of
innocence or privilege against self-incrimination;" (4) the "destruction of
smeared, latent fingerprints did not violate due process;" and (5) "the appellate
court's conclusion that [Torres's ] death sentence did not violate the Eighth
Amendment was not an unreasonable application of federal law").
138 Torres v. Mullin, 540 U.S. 1035, 1035 (2003). For a more detailed
discussion of the procedural history, see Finstuen, supra note 119, at 269-71.
139 Torres, 540 U.S. at 1036 (Stevens, J., op. respecting denial of pet. for
writ of cert.).
140 Torres, 120 P.3d at 1184.
141 Finstuen, supra note 119, at 258.
142 Id.
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recommendation to stay Torres's execution and Oklahoma
Governor Brad Henry's grant of clemency, signaling a united
approach from governmental officials and the state judiciary to a
Vienna Convention claim." 43
In its decision to remand the case, the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals adopted a three-prong test which assessed: "(1)
whether the defendant did not know he had a right to contact his
consulate for assistance; (2) whether he would have availed
himself of the right had he known of it; and (3) whether it was
likely that the consulate would have assisted the defendant."1 4 4
When detailing how to assess the third prong, the court held
that "the defendant must present evidence showing what efforts
his consulate would have made to assist in his criminal case." 45 It
further stated prejudice is assumed if the presence of all three
factors is established. 146  The court also emphasized the third
prong does not require the defendant to show the outcome of the
case would have been different had the consulate been able to
assist the defendant in his case.147 In the past, the United States
had allowed states to decide whether to follow the ICJ's rulings.148
The Torres decision suggests that Oklahoma resolved three issues
regarding its own state proceedings. Specifically, it found:
(1) the ICJ's ruling in Avena to be authoritative upon its own
judicial process;
(2) the Vienna Convention to be self-executing and affirmed a
private right of action for violations of the Convention;' 49 and
(3) the appropriate remedy for such a violation by remanding the
case for further evidentiary hearing.150
143 Id
144 Torres, 120 P.3d at 1186.
145 Id
146 Id
147 Id. at 1187.
148 See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Breard and the Federal Power to Require
Compliance with ICJ Orders of Provisional Measures, 92 AM. J. INT'L L., 683,
683 (1998) (noting the United States left the decision to follow the ICJ's order
up to the governor of Virginia who declined to follow).
149 See Finstuen, supra note 119, at 275-76.
150 For an in depth discussion of these three resolutions, see Finstuen, supra
note 119, at 275-76.
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For eight years, Oklahoma remained the only state to resolve these
issues in favor of the aggrieved defendant.' 1
2. Medellin v. State of Texas
Jose Ernesto Medellin was sentenced to death for capital
murder in September 1993.152 After numerous failed petitions,
Medellin's case finally reached the United States Supreme Court
in May 2005.1' His lawyers hoped the then-recent Avena
judgment would provide Medellin with a result different from his
past appeals.'5 4  However, the United States Supreme Court
dismissed the case, finding Medellin's subsequent state habeas
motion could provide the review and reconsideration required by
Avena.'5 5  The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed
Medellin's application for a habeas review.'56 Quoting the
Supreme Court in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon,15 the Texas court
found "ICJ decisions are not binding on United States courts."' 5 8
The court also addressed President Bush's memo, 5 9 which urged
states to comply with the Avena requirements; in so doing, the
Texas court asserted the President had exceeded his authority and
could not "dictate to the judiciary what law to apply or how to
interpret the applicable law" because this is a power reserved to
the judicial branch.'6 0 In response, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to hear the case and held Avena did not
'5' Torres v. State, when decided by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals, was decided in 2004, and Medellin's case, resolved by the United
Supreme Court, was decided in 2005. Torres v. State, 120 P.3d 1184 (Okla.
Crim. App. May 13, 2004); Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005).
152 Medellin v. Cockrell, No. CIV.A H-01-4078, 2003 WL 25321243, at *1
(S.D. Tex. June 25, 2003).
153 Medellin, 544 U.S. 660.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 666-67.
156 Ex Parte Medellin, 223 S.W.3d 315, 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
157 548 U.S. 331 (2006).
158 Ex Parte Medellin, 223 S.W.3d at 332.
159 President George W. Bush's Memorandum for the Attorney General
(Feb. 28, 2005), available at georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/
releases/2005/02/20050
228-18.html.
160 Ex Parte Medellin, 223 S.W.3d at 335 (quoting Sanchez-Llamas, 548
U.S. at 354 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803))).
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have a direct effect on state law and that President Bush's memo
did not require states to comply with the ICJ's decision to review
and reconsider Medellin's case nor the cases of other affected
Mexican nationals." Ultimately, Medellin sought a stay of
execution from the United States Supreme Court, which was
denied; hours later, he was executed.'62
The first issue the United States Supreme Court confronted in
Medellin was to determine whether or not the Vienna Convention
treaty was self-executing." While the Court acknowledged the
Convention was an international legal obligation for the United
States, it also cautioned that "not all international law obligations
automatically constitute binding federal law enforceable in United
States courts." 64  "While treaties 'may comprise international
commitments ... [,] they are not domestic law unless Congress
has either enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself
conveys an intention that it be "self-executing" and is ratified on
these terms."l 65 1In short, the United States Supreme Court found
the Vienna Convention was not a self-executing treaty based on its
language and Congress had not enacted any legislation
implementing its provisions. Thus, Avena was not automatically
binding domestic law. 166
The second issue the Court confronted was the binding nature
of President Bush's memorandum, a document that supported
Avena operating as binding domestic law in the United States.167
Its decision was simple: the power to transform an international
obligation into domestic law is vested solely in the legislative
branch.'6 8 Thus, while the President could represent the United
States in front of the international bodies and tribunals such as the
161 Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 523-32 (2008).
162 James C. McKinley, Jr., Texas Executes Mexican Despite Objections,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2008, at A10.
163 Medellin, 552 U.S. at 504-23.
164 Id. at 504.
165 Id. at 505 (citing Igartia-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145,
150 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Boudin, C.J.)).
166 Id. at 506.
167 Id. at 523-32.
168 See id. at 526 (citing Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 315, 2 Pet. 253,
315 (1829); Whitney v. Roberston, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); Igartria-De La
Rosa, 417 F.3d at 150).
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United Nations and the ICJ, this role on the international stage did
not extend into a unilateral presidential authority to create
domestic law.169
In Medellin, Justice Stevens provided an important
concurrence. "The entire Court and the President agree that
breach will jeopardize the United States' 'plainly compelling'
interests in 'ensuring the reciprocal observance of the Vienna
Convention, protecting relations with foreign governments, and
demonstrating commitment to the role of international law."' 170
His concurrence further noted the United States' obligation to
comply with the ICJ's ruling falls to each of the states, and that
since Texas' failure to provide notification of the consular right
"ensnared the United States in the current controversy" of
breaching the Vienna Convention, Texas should implement
measures to ensure it does not breach the ICJ's Avena ruling as
well.17 1  Ultimately, Stevens reserved discretion to the states to
"shoulder the primary responsibility for protecting the honor and
integrity of the Nation." 7 2 The Medellin decision, according to
Stevens, does not foreclose states from taking further appropriate
action. 173 According to his rationale, it is each State's failure to
provide adequate notice that causes the breach in the treaty. 174
Thus, the noncompliant State must take extra responsibility in
remedying the situation.'7 ' The strongest distinction between
169 Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 529 (2008).
170 Id. at 537 (Stevens, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted).
171 Id. at 536.
172 Id
173 Id. at 537.
174 Id. at 536. Justice Stevens stated:
Under the express terms of the Supremacy Clause, the United
States' obligation to 'undertak[e] to comply' with the ICJ's decision
falls on each of the States as well as the Federal Government. One
consequence of our form of government is that sometimes States
must shoulder the primary responsibility for protecting the honor
and integrity of the Nation. Texas' duty in this respect is all the
greater since it was Texas that-by failing to provide consular
notice in accordance with the Vienna Convention-ensnared the
United States in the current controversy. Having put the nation in
breach of one treaty, it is now up to Texas to prevent the breach of
another. Id.
'75 Id.
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Medellin's case and Torres' case described above is that neither
Texas nor the United States Supreme Court found Medellin had
been actually prejudiced by his lack of consular access, where the
Oklahoma court saw the possibility of prejudice in Torres's
case.176
3. Leal Garcia v. State of Texas
Humberto Leal Garcia (Leal) was convicted of murder and
sentenced to death in 1995 for the murder of a sixteen-year-old
girl during an aggravated sexual assault.17 7  After the Avena
decision,178 Leal petitioned the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
after the Avena decision, which denied the appeal.' Leal finally
filed a writ of certiorari and stay of execution to the United States
Supreme Court so that Congress could consider whether to enact
legislation incorporating the Avena decision into domestic law.'
Both were denied.'"' In Leal Garcia v. State of Texas (Leal), the
Court held it had never stayed an execution due to the prospect of
future applicable legislation:
It has now been seven years since the ICJ ruling and three years
176 Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 501-02 (2008) (stating that "[t]he trial
court also rejected the Vienna Convention claim on its merits, finding that
Medellin had 'fail[ed] to show that any non-notification of the Mexican
authorities impacted on the validity of his conviction or punishment"'); id. at
501 n.1 (stating that the Supreme Court's "disposition of this case ... need not
consider whether Medellin was prejudiced in any way by the violation of his
Vienna Convention rights"); Torres v. State, 120 P.3d 1184, 1188 (Okla. Crim.
App. 2004) ("Torres clearly showed that the Mexican government would have
expended considerable resources on the capital phase of his case. If Torres
were still under a capital sentence, this would indeed amount to a showing of
prejudice.").
177 Leal Garcia v. Quarterman, 573 F.3d 214, 216 (5th Cir. 2009).
178 See id. at 217 for a full timeline of Leal's procedural history.
179 Ex parte Cardenas, No. WR-41743-02, 2007 WL 678628, at *1 (Tex.
Crim. App. Mar. 7, 2007) (citing Ex parte Medellin, 223 S.W.3d 315 (Tex.
Crim. App. Nov. 15, 2006)).
180 See Leal Garcia v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 2866, 2867, 180 L. Ed. 2d 872
(2011) (explaining that in June 2011, Senator Patrick Leahy introduced
legislation to the Senate with the support of the Executive Branch implementing
the Avena decision while the House of Representatives has not).
181 Id. at 2867 ("Due Process Clause does not prohibit a State from carrying
out a lawful judgment in light of unenacted legislation that might someday
authorize a collateral attack on that judgment.").
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since our decision in Medellin I, making a stay based on the bare
introduction of a bill in a single house of Congress even less
justified. If a statute implementing Avena had genuinely been a
priority for the political branches, it would have been enacted by
now.1 82
The Court further noted that even based on a Vienna
Convention claim, the lower courts had found Leal had not been
prejudiced by his lack of consular access.'83
Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, addressing the policy
ramifications of such decisions to ignore instructions from the
ICJ.18 4 The dissenters pointed out that the decision in Medellin
relied in significant part on a determination the "President ...
ha[d] [not] represented to [the Court] that there is any likelihood
of congressional . . . action."' This was remedied in Leal by
showing "Senator Patrick Leahy, the chairman of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, has introduced (and expressed an
intention to hold speedy hearings on) a bill that would permit Leal
and other similarly situated individuals to obtain the hearing that
international law requires."' 8 6
There are also strong foreign-policy interests affected by a
decision to violate international legal obligations.'8 7  First, the
decision would cause harm the United States' relationship with
Mexico as the violations of its foreign nationals' rights continue to
accrue.' In its brief, the Government of Mexico made clear that
declining to stay Leal's execution "would seriously jeopardize the
ability of the Government of Mexico to continue working
collaboratively with the United States on a number of joint
ventures, including extraditions, mutual judicial assistance, and
efforts to strengthen our common border."' 89  Second,
182 Id. at 2868.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 2869-70 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
185 Id. (citing Medellin v. Texas, 554 U.S. 759, 759-60 (2008) (per
curiam)).
186 Leal Garcia, 131 S. Ct. at 2869.
187 Id. at 2870.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 2870.
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noncompliance could pose serious harm to the rights of American
citizens detained abroad by failing to extend to them the benefits
of consular assistance that the Vienna Convention provides.' 90
The dissent seems to suggest the majority opinion has violated the
separation of powers doctrine by making decisions related to
powers that are constitutionally delegated to other branches."'
IV. Analysis and Impact of Gutierrez
Following these Texas executions, an Avena defendant finally
received reprieve in the Supreme Court of Nevada where the court
held that Gutierrez had been actually prejudiced by the State's
violation of his Vienna Convention rights.'92 Nevada became the
second state to be swayed by Justice Stevens' plea to voluntarily
undertake to comply with the Avena ruling and took on the
"greater level of duty" to mollify the consequences of their
breach.'93  Avena requires the United States to review and
reconsider the sentences of the affected Mexican nationals "by
means of its own choosing."' 9 4 The standard by which to review
and reconsider must be made by detennining "whether the failure
to provide proper notice to consular officials caused actual
prejudice to the defendant in the process of administration of
criminal justice."l9
The Nevada court acknowledged Avena does not require the
ICJ's postconviction review procedures to preempt the state
specific postconviction procedure.' 96  Accordingly, the United
States Supreme Court rejected the postconviction claims of Leal
and Medellin.'9 ' However, in both cases, the Supreme Court
190 Id.
191 Id. at 2871 ("[T]he Court ignores the appeal of the President in a matter
related to foreign affairs, it substitutes its own views about the likelihood of
congressional action[.]").
192 Gutierrez v. State, No. 53506, 2012 WL 4355518, at *2 (Nev. Sept. 19,
2012).
'93 Id.
194 Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.),
2004 I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31), at 64.
195 Gutierrez, 2012 WL 4355518, at *1 (quoting Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 60)
(internal citations omitted).
196 Id
197 See supra Part III.C.2-3.
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emphasized that neither defendant had been actually prejudiced by
his lack of timely consular access.'98 Though Avena does not
subordinate state procedural rules automatically, absent any
Congressional legislation, the Court pointed out that states may
choose to substitute the Avena rules for their own, if actual
prejudice can be demonstrated by the Vienna Convention
violation.'99 Nevada further emphasized "Justice Stevens rightly
described [the burden of complying with Avena] as 'minimal'
when balanced against the United States' 'plainly compelling
interests in ensuring the reciprocal observance of the Vienna
Convention, protecting relations with foreign governments, and
demonstrating commitment to the role of international law."'
2 00
The court distinguished the United States Supreme Court cases
of Medellin and Leal, while balancing similarities against the
Torres case, because Gutierrez "arguably suffered actual prejudice
due to the lack of consular assistance." 201' At twenty-six-years-old,
with very little English speaking capacity, Gutierrez had the
Mexican equivalent of a sixth-grade education; he clearly needed
assistance in navigating the American legal system.20 2 The closest
Mexican consulate swore in an affidavit that it would have assisted
Gutierrez through his judicial process had the consulate been
timely notified.203  Gutierrez suffered further prejudice in the
course of his case by the court interpreter, Gonzalez, who falsified
his credentials as an interpreter and was later convicted of
perjury.20 Even the State's interpreter expressed concern
regarding Gonzalez's accuracy during the hearing.205 The State
198 Id.
199 See Gutierrez, 2012 WL 4355518, at *1 (citing Medellin v. Texas, 552
U.S. 491, 533, 536-37 & n.4 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring) (discussing Torres
v. State, 120 P.3d 1184 (Okla. Crim. App. May 13, 2004), where Oklahoma
"unhesitatingly assumed" the burden of complying with Avena by ordering "an
evidentiary hearing on whether Torres has been prejudiced by the lack of
consular notification")).
200 Medellin, 552 U.S. at 537 (Stevens, J., concurring) (internal citations
omitted).
201 Gutierrez, 2012 WL 4355518, at *2.
202 Id
203 Id
204 Id
205 See id. ("[T]he State described interpreter Gonzalez as 'a sociopath'
who, while 'articulate, well groomed, [and] well mannered ... does not know
216 Vol. XXXIX
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN STATE COURTS
acknowledged Gonzalez's role as integral to Gutierrez's
sentencing hearing.206 It must be resolved in an evidentiary
hearing whether the errors Gonzalez had made while translating
were prejudicial and fundamentally erroneous enough to render
the interpretation constitutionally inadequate.2 07 Accordingly, the
Nevada Supreme Court remanded the case for further evidentiary
hearing: "Perhaps timely consular notice would not have changed
anything for Gutierrez; perhaps the interpreter's skills, despite his
perjury, were sound. These are issues on which an evidentiary
hearing needs to be held." 208  The Nevada Supreme Court's
decision marks an important step in shifting the trend towards
states applying international law procedures within their judicial
proceedings.2 09 While previously there had been a balance of one
state on each side (Oklahoma chose to uphold the Avena decision;
while Texas did not), the scale has tipped towards greater
international cooperation.2o This provides two decisions to future
states confronted with these issues on which to rely in choosing to
uphold international law obligations in their courts.2 1'
The Nevada court was particularly troubled by the falsified
credentials of the interpreter and emphasized the hypocritical
nature of the United States' treatment of the Vienna Convention
rights:
What is clear, though, is if a non-Spanish speaking U.S. citizen
were detained in Mexico on serious criminal charges, the
American consulate was not notified, and the interpreter who
translated from English into Spanish at the trial for the Spanish-
speaking judges was later convicted of having falsified his
credentials, we would expect Mexico, on order of the ICJ, to
review the reliability of the proceedings and the extent to which,
if at all, timely notice to the American consulate might have
how to recognize or offer truthful assertions."').
206 Id
207 Gutierrez, 2012 WL 4355518, at *2. See generally Baltazar-Monterrosa
v. State, 122 Nev. 606, 613-17, 137 P.3d 1137, 1142-44 (2006) (discussing that
the right to a fair trial may be impaired if the interpretations change the
fundamental nature of the testimony).
208 Gutierrez, 2012 WL 4355518, at *3.
209 See id.
210 See id.
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regularized them. 212
This raises an important concern for the United States, which
has vehemently required foreign nations to accord American
citizens with the same Vienna Convention rights it has denied to
so many foreign nationals. 213  If the United States continues
choosing to ignore its international legal obligations and alienates
nations by depriving their citizens of their international legal
rights, American citizens might find themselves in foreign jails
without consular access in the same way.2 14 Mexico has already
expressed animosity in its Leal amicus brief that these continued
executions and breaches of Vienna Convention obligations "would
seriously jeopardize the ability of the Government of Mexico to
continue working collaboratively with the United States."2 15
More than 2,500 Americans are arrested abroad each year.2 16
In a system that relies so heavily on reciprocity to govern much of
international law,217 failing to abide by the Vienna Convention
212 See id
213 See id.
214 See Gutierrez, 2012 WL 4355518, at *3.
215 Brief for Government of Mexico as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner
at 23, Leal Garcia v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 2866, 180 L. Ed. 2d 872 (2011) (No. 11-
5001).
216 Heather M. Heath, Non-Compliance with the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations and Its Effect on Reciprocity for United States Citizens
Abroad, 17 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 1, 9 (2004); see also Mari Shinkai, Travel
Abroad Requires Knowledge ofDestination, U. WIRE, Mar. 3, 2003 (stating that
more than 2,500 American citizens are arrested outside of the United States
each year); U.S. Dep't of State, OFFICE OF OVERSEAS CITIZENS SERVICES,
BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFIARS, PUBL'N No. 10252 (2002), available
at http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps49674/travel.state.gov/travel/
overseas citizens.html.
217 Heath, supra note 216, at 10 (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 228
(1895)) (asserting the tenet that international law is based upon reciprocity and
mutuality); see also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 323 (1988) (recognizing the
crucial cornerstone of reciprocity in international law); United States v.
Superville, 40 F. Supp. 2d 672, 676 (N.D. 111. 1999) (explaining the importance
of reciprocal respect under the obligations of the Vienna Convention). See
generally Francesco Parisi & Nita Ghei, The Role of Reciprocity in
International Law, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 93, 93 (2003) (reviewing the
importance of reciprocity to enforce international law); C.M. Chinkin, Third-
Party Intervention Before the International Court ofJustice, 80 AM. J. INT'L. L.
495, 501 (1986) (stating that reciprocity is a cornerstone of international law);
Harold G. Maier, A Hague Conference Judgments Convention and United
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could jeopardize the influence of these agreements entirely.2 18
Senator Leahy addressed the continued reciprocity required to
keep the Vienna Convention effective when he introduced
legislation in the Senate to bring the United States into compliance
with the treaty through the Consular Notification Compliance Act:
"[a]ccess is protected by the consular notification provisions of the
[Vienna Convention], but it only functions effectively if every
country meets its obligations under the treaty-including the United
States." 2 19 As an influential nation within the global setting, the
United States should continuously strive to uphold its international
legal obligations; noncompliance jeopardizes the United States'
credibility and questions the nation's "commitment to
international treaties." 2 0 The Obama Administration endorsed the
bill with letters of support from the Attorney General, Eric Holder,
and Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton. Secretary Clinton
further sent letters to the members of the Senate Judiciary
Committee urging speedy action on the bill: "Swift enactment of
this bill would serve our critical interests-also recognized by the
prior Administration-in protecting American citizens, preserving
our foreign policy relations, and abiding by vital treaties to which
States Courts: A Problem and a Possibility, 61 ALB. L. REv. 1207, 1223-25
(1998) (asserting that reciprocity is the foundation of international law).
218 Heath, supra note 216, at 10 (citing United States v. Superville, 40 F.
Supp. 2d at 676) (explaining that the Secretary of State has expressed concern
that "[t]he execution ... could lead some countries to contend incorrectly that
the U.S. does not take seriously its obligations under the Convention"); see
also Ronald L. Hanna, Comment, Consular Access to Detained Foreign
Nationals: An Overview of the Current Application of the Vienna Convention in
Criminal Practice, 25 S. ILL. U. L.J. 163, 177 (2000) (stressing the importance
of honoring the rights of foreign nationals arrested in the United States if such
rights are to be recognized for United States citizens arrested abroad); Molora
Vadnais, A Diplomatic Morass: An Argument Against Judicial Involvement in
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 47 UCLA L. REV.
307, 335 (1999) (recognizing the danger U.S. citizens arrested abroad may face
if the consular rights under the Vienna Convention are not extended to foreign
nationals arrested within the United States).
219 Press Release, Senator Patrick Leahy, Leahy Renews Effort to Bring
U.S. Into Compliance With International Consular Notification Treaty (June 4,
2011), available at http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/leahy-renews-effort-to-
bring-us-into-compliance-with-international-consular-notification-treaty.
220 Heath, supra note 216, at 10.
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the Senate has advised and consented[.]" 2 21 Though the Senate
legislation did not survive the committee process, perhaps this
recent decision by Nevada will reignite a fire in Congress towards
passing similar legislation in the future. Although the United
States Supreme Court may have chosen to ignore the nation's
interest in complying with international legal obligations, it is
optimistic that some states have chosen to acknowledge such an
important impact and will hopefully continue to do so in the
future. If the United States fails at this critical juncture to uphold
the international rule of law, other nations will likely follow suit.
V. Conclusion
Nevada's decision "provides important ammunition to foreign
nationals seeking review of their Vienna Convention claims in
states other than Texas."22 2 Texas remains the only state to reject
the notion of reconsidering convictions of defendants who failed
to receive a Vienna Convention right and chose not to uphold the
ICJ ruling in Avena. Lawyers should fervently continue to litigate
Vienna Convention violations, especially on defendants subject to
the Avena decision. Nevada and Oklahoma have now provided
other jurisdictions with two decisions upon which to rely, if they
choose to uphold the Avena decision and Vienna Convention
rights within their states. Furthermore, the decision's call to
consider the repercussions of this decision for American citizens
abroad can bring to the forefront the importance of the United
States adhering to its international legal obligations. Perhaps this
will spark congressional action in passing legislation similar to the
Consular Notification Compliance Act. This legislation would
bring with it an important message to the international community,
a demonstration of the United States' commitment and dedication
to its international treaty obligations. Regardless of whether this
sparks discussion of national legislation, if states continue to
follow in Nevada's footsteps, nations like Mexico will feel more
supported by the United States. This could go a long way in
mending the broken international relationships of America.
221 Letter from Hilary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec'y of State, to Sen. Patrick
Leahy, Chair of the S. Judiciary Comm. (July 7, 2011), available at
http://www.leahy.senate.gov/imo/medialdoc/0727 11 ClintonToLeahy.pdf.
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Nevada's decision may change the course of action for more states
litigating the Vienna Convention rights of foreign nationals in
their jurisdictions. For Gutierrez, while he gave no consideration
to the life of his three-year-old stepdaughter, the Nevada decision
gives him a small glimmer of hope towards saving his own life.

